Preference satisfaction and welfare economics

Economics and Philosophy

Volumn 25, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 1-25

  Hausman, Daniel M ^a   McPherson, Michael S ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

^b Spencer Foundation   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 68349138152     PISSN: 02662671     EISSN: 14740028     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0266267108002253     Document Type: Article

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