Non-consequentialist voting

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 81, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 299-313

  Shayo, Moses ^a   Harel, Alon ^a  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

Democracy; Elections; Expressive voting; Extended preferences; Social preferences

Indexed keywords

EID: 82655162591     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2011.10.021     Document Type: Article

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