On the economic theory of interest groups: Towards a group frame of reference in political economics

Public Choice

Volumn 100, Issue 1-2, 1999, Pages 1-29

  Van Winden, Frans ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033435326     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1018347607116     Document Type: Article

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