Behavioral economic engineering

Journal of Economic Psychology

Volumn 33, Issue 3, 2012, Pages 665-676

  Bolton, Gary E ^a   Ockenfels, Axel ^b  

^a PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF COLOGNE   (Germany)

Author keywords

Behavioral economics; Economic engineering; Experimental economics

Indexed keywords

EID: 84857650706     PISSN: 01674870     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2011.09.003     Document Type: Review

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