Expressive voting and electoral equilibrium

Public Choice

Volumn 95, Issue 1-2, 1998, Pages 149-175

  Brennan, Geoffrey ^a   Hamlin, Alan ^b  

^a AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032389859     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1004936203144     Document Type: Article

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