A behavioral approach to the rational choice theory of collective action presidential address, American political science association, 1997

American Political Science Review

Volumn 92, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 1-22

  Ostrom, Elinor ^a  

^a INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032018622     PISSN: 00030554     EISSN: 15375943     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2585925     Document Type: Article

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