Informational lobbying and political contributions

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 90, Issue 4-5, 2006, Pages 631-656

  Bennedsen, Morten ^a   Feldmann, Sven E ^b  

^a Department of International Economics and Management   (Denmark)

^b NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Asymmetric information; Common agency; Lobbying; Political contributions

Indexed keywords

EID: 33645946061     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.08.003     Document Type: Article

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