Biased beliefs and retrospective voting: Why democracies choose mediocre policies

Public Choice

Volumn 156, Issue 1-2, 2013, Pages 163-180

  Bischoff, Ivo ^a   Siemers, Lars H R ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KASSEL   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SIEGEN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Biased beliefs; Dynamic party competition; Mental models; Retrospective voting; Valence; Voting behavior

Indexed keywords

EID: 84878948712     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-011-9889-5     Document Type: Article

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