The good, the bad and the populist: A model of political agency with emotional voters

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 27, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 611-624

  Jennings, Colin ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF STRATHCLYDE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Democratic inefficiency; Expressive voting; Political agency; Populism; Rational irrationality

Indexed keywords

EID: 80053131896     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2011.03.005     Document Type: Article

References (40)

1. Acemoglu D., Robinson J.A. Inefficient redistribution. American Political Science Review 2001, 95:649-661.
2. Aidt T.S. Economic analysis of corruption: a survey. The Economic Journal 2003, 113:F632-F652.
3. Aidt T.S. Redistribution and deadweight cost: the role of political competition. European Journal of Politcal Economy 2003, 19:205-226.
4. Alesina A., Tabellini G. A positive theory of fiscal deficits and government debt. Review of Economic Studies 1990, 57:403-414.
5. Barro R. The control of politicians: an economic model. Public Choice 1973, 14:19-42.
6. Becker G.S. A theory of competition among pressure groups. Quarterly Journal of Economics 1983, 98:371-400.
7. Besley T. Principled Agents: The Political Economy of Good Government 2006, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
8. Brennan G. Politics, selection and the public interest: Besley's benevolent despot. Review of Austrian Economics 2009, 22:131-143.
9. Brennan G., Buchanan J.M. The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of the Fiscal Constitution 1980, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge U.K.
10. Brennan G., Hamlin A. Expressive voting and electoral equilibrium. Public Choice 1998, 95:149-175.
11. Brennan G., Hamlin A. On political representation. British Journal of Political Science 1999, 29:109-127.
12. Brennan G., Lomasky L. Democracy and Decision 1993, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge U.K.
13. Canes-Wrone B., Herron M.C., Shotts K.W. Leadership and pandering: a theory of executive policymaking. American Journal of Political Science 2001, 45:532-550.
14. Canovan M. Trust the people! Populism and the two faces of democracy. Political Studies 1999, 47:2-16.
15. Caplan B. Systematically biased beliefs about economics: robust evidence of judgemental anomalies from the survey of Americans and economists on the economy. The Economic Journal 2002, 112:433-458.
16. Caplan B. The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies 2007, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ.
17. Caplan B. Irrational principals. Review of Austrian Economics 2009, 22:159-167.
18. Coate S., Morris S. On the form of transfers to special interests. Journal of Political Economy 1995, 103:1210-1235.
19. Downs A. An Economic Theory of Democracy 1957, Harper and Row, New York.
20. Fearon J.D. Rationalist explanations for war. International Organization 1995, 49:379-414.
21. Feddersen T.J., Pesendorfer W. The swing voter's curse. The American Economic Review 1996, 96:408-424.
22. Ferejohn J. Incumbent performance and electoral control. Public Choice 1986, 50:5-25.
23. Hamlin A., Jennings C. Expressive political behaviour: foundations, scope and implications. British Journal of Political Science 2011, 10.1017/S0007123411000020.
24. Hillman A.L. Expressive behaviour in economics and politics. European Journal of Political Economy 2010, 26:403-418.
25. Kliemt H. The veil of insignificance. European Journal of Political Economy 1986, 2(3):333-344.
26. Liu Q. How to improve government performance?. European Journal of Political Economy 2007, 23:1198-1206.
27. Lupia A., Menning J.O. When can politicians scare citizens into supporting bad policies?. American Journal of Political Science 2009, 53:90-106.
28. Maskin E., Tirole J. The politician and the judge: accountability in government. The American Economic Review 2004, 94:1034-1054.
29. Mayda A.M., Rodrik D. Why are some people (and countries) more protectionist than others?. European Economic Review 2003, 49:1393-1430.
30. Mejía D., Posada C.E. Populist policies in transition to democracy. European Journal of Political Economy 2007, 23:932-953.
31. Morris S. Political correctness. Journal of Political Economy 2001, 109:231-267.
32. Persson T., Svensson L. Why a stubborn conservative would run a deficit: policy with time-inconsistent preferences. Quarterly Journal of Economics 1989, 104:325-345.
33. Robinson J.A. Theories of 'bad policy'. Journal of Policy Reform 1998, 3:1-46.
34. Rodrik D. Understanding economic policy reform. Journal of Economic Literature 1996, 34:9-41.
35. Romer D. Misconceptions and political outcomes. The Economic Journal 2003, 113:1-20.
36. Sobbrio F., Navarra P. Electoral participation and communicative voting in Europe. European Journal of Political Economy 2010, 26:185-207.
37. Tullock G. Economics of Income Redistribution 1983, Kluwer-Nijhoff, Boston.
38. Westen D. The Political Brain: The Role of Emotion in Deciding the Fate of the Nation 2007, Public Affairs, New York.
39. Wittman D. Why democracies produce efficient results. Journal of Political Economy 1989, 97:1395-1424.
40. Wittman D. The Myth of Democratic Failure: Why Political Institutions Are Efficient 1995, University of Chicago Press, Chicago IL.