The contribution of behavioral economics to political science

Annual Review of Political Science

Volumn 14, Issue , 2011, Pages 201-223

  Wilson, Rick K ^a  

^a RICE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

behavioral anomalies; experimental economics; prospect theory; social preferences; time discounting

Indexed keywords

EID: 79955957807     PISSN: 10942939     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev-polisci-041309-114513     Document Type: Article

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