Rational irrationality and the microfoundations of political failure

Public Choice

Volumn 107, Issue 3-4, 2001, Pages 311-331

  Caplan, Bryan ^a  

^a GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035596450     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1010311704540     Document Type: Article

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