Time for behavioral political economy? An analysis of articles in behavioral economics

Review of Austrian Economics

Volumn 25, Issue 3, 2012, Pages 199-221

  Berggren, Niclas ^a  

^a RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS IFN   (Sweden)

Author keywords

Anomalies; Behavioral economics; Homo economicus; Public choice; Rationality; Robust political economy

Indexed keywords

EID: 84864385486     PISSN: 08893047     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11138-011-0159-z     Document Type: Article

References (73)

1. Ameriks, J., Caplin, A., & Leahy, J. (2003). Wealth accumulation and the propensity to plan. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(3), 1007-1046.
2. Ashraf, N., Camerer, C., & Lowenstein, G. (2005). Adam Smith, behavioral economist. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19(3), 131-146.
3. Beaulier, S. A., & Subrick, J. R. (2006). Poverty traps and the robust political economy of development assistance. The Review of Austrian Economics, 19(2-3), 217-226.
4. Bénabou, R. (2009). Groupthink: collective delusions in organizations and markets. NBER working paper 14764. Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research.
5. Berg, N., & Gigerenzer, G. (2010). As-if behavioral economics: neoclassical economics in disguise? History of Economic Ideas, 18(1), 133-166.
6. Bernheim, B. D., & Rangel, A. (2004). Addiction and cue-triggered decision processes. The American Economic Review, 94(5), 1558-1590.
7. Boettke, P. J., & Leeson, P. T. (2004). Liberalism, socialism, and robust political economy. Journal of Markets & Morality, 7(1), 99-111.
8. Boettke, P. J., & López, E. J. (2002). Austrian economics and public choice. The Review of Austrian Economics, 15(2-3), 111-119.
9. Boettke, P. J., Coyne, C. J., & Leeson, P. J. (2007). Saving government failure theory from itself: Recasting political economy from an Austrian perspective. Constitutional Political Economy, 18(2), 127-1423.
10. Bowles, S., & Gintis, H. (2000). Walrasian economics in retrospect. Quartely Journal of Economics, 115(4), 1411-1439.
11. Brennan, G., & Buchanan, J. M. (1984). The normative purpose of economic 'science': Rediscovery of an eighteenth-century method. In J. M. Buchanan & R. D. Tollison (Eds.), The theory of public choice-II (pp. 382-394). Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
12. Brennan, G., & Buchanan, J. M. (1985). The reason of rules: Constitutional political economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
13. Buchanan, J. M. (1949). The pure theory of government finance: A suggested approach. Journal of Political Economy, 57(6), 496-505.
14. Buchanan, J. M. (1967). The fiscal illusion. In Public finance in democratic process: Fiscal institutions and individual choice (pp. 126-143). Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
15. Buchanan, J. M. (1984). Politics without romance: A sketch of positive public choice theory and its normative implications. In J. M. Buchanan & R. D. Tollison (Eds.), The theory of public choice-II (pp. 11-22). Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
16. Buchanan, J. M., & Tullock, G. (1962). The calculus of consent: Logical foundations of constitutional democracy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
17. Camerer, C. F., & Loewenstein, G. (2004). Behavioral economics: Past, present, future. In C. F. Camerer, G. Loewenstein, & M. Rabin (Eds.), Advances in behavioral economics (pp. 3-51). New York: Princeton University Press.
18. Camerer, C. F., Issacharoff, S., Loewenstein, G., O'Donoghue, T., & Rabin, M. (2003). Regulation for conservatives: Behavioral economics and the case for "asymmetric paternalism". University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 151(3), 1211-1254.
19. Caplan, B. (2007). The myth of the rational voter: Why democracies choose bad policies. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
20. Coase, R. H. (1994). Adam Smith's view of man. In Essays on economics and economists (pp. 95-116). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
21. Conlisk, J. (1996). Why bounded rationality? Journal of Economic Literature, 34(2), 669-700.
22. Dasgupta, P., & Maskin, E. (2005). Uncertainty and hyperbolic discounting. The American Economic Review, 95(4), 1290-1299.
23. DellaVigna, S. (2009). Psychology and economics: Evidence from the field. Journal of Economic Literature, 47(2), 315-372.
24. Diamond, P., & Vartiainen, H. (Eds.). (2007). Behavioral economics and its applications. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
25. Dufwenberg, M. (2007). Review of behavioral economics and its application. Journal of Economic Psychology, 28(5), 622-624.
26. Dworkin, G. (2009). Paternalism. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2009 Edition). URL: http://plato. stanford. edu/archives/sum2009/entries/paternalism/. Accessed 24 April, 2010.
27. Eliaz, K., & Spiegler, R. (2006). Contracting with diversely naïve agents. Review of Economics Studies, 73(3), 689-714.
28. Gigerenzer, G., & Gaissmaier, W. (2011). Heuristic decision making. Annual Review of Psychology, 62(1), 451-482.
29. Glaeser, E. L. (2004). Psychology and the market. The American Economic Review, 94(2), 408-413.
30. Glaeser, E. L. (2006). Paternalism and psychology. The University of Chicago Law Review, 73(1), 133-156.
31. Hayek, F. A. (1937). Economics and knowledge. Economica, 4(13), 33-54.
32. Hayek, F. A. (1945). The use of knowledge in society. The American Economic Review, 35(4), 519-530.
33. Hayek, F. A. (1960). The constitution of liberty. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
34. Hillman, A. L. (2010). Expressive behavior in economics and politics. European Journal of Political Economy, 26(4), 403-418.
35. Holcombe, R. G. (2009). The behavioral foundations of Austrian economics. The Review of Austrian Economics, 22(4), 301-313.
36. Jeleva, M., & Rossignol, S. (2009). Political decision of risk reduction: The role of trust. Public Choice, 139(1-2), 83-104.
37. Kahneman, D. (2003). Maps of bounded rationality: Psychology for behavioral economics. The American Economic Review, 93(5), 1449-1475.
38. Kalaitzidakis, P., Mamuneas, T. P., & Stengos, T. (2003). Rankings of academic journals and institutions in economics. Journal of the European Economic Association, 1(6), 1346-1366.
39. Klein, D. B. (1994). If government is so villainous, how come government officials don't seem like villains? Economics and Philosophy, 10(1), 91-106.
40. Klein, D. B. (2004). Status quo bias. Econ Journal Watch, 1(2), 260-271.
41. Klein, D. B., & Stern, C. (2009). Groupthink in academia: Majoritarian departmental politics and the professional pyramid. Independent Review, 13(4), 585-600.
42. Kliemt, H. (2005). Public choice and political philosophy: Reflections on the works of Gordon Spinoza and David Immanuel Buchanan. Public Choice, 125(1-2), 203-213.
43. Kodrzycki, Y. K., & Yu, P. (2006) New approaches to ranking economics journals. The B. E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 5(1), Article 24.
44. Krishna, V., & Morgan, J. (2001). A model of expertise. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(2), 747-775.
45. Krusell, P., Kuruscu, B., & Smith, A. A., Jr. (2002). Equilibrium welfare and government policy with quasi-geometric discounting. Journal of Economic Theory, 105(1), 42-72.
46. Kuran, T. (1996). Private truths, public lies: The social consequences of preference falsification. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
47. Langlois, R. N. (1985). Knowledge and rationality in the Austrian school: An analytical survey. Eastern Economic Journal, 11(4), 309-330.
48. Leeson, P. T., & Subrick, J. R. (2006). Robust political economy. The Review of Austrian Economics, 19(2-3), 107-111.
49. Levitt, S. D., & List, J. A. (2008). Homo economicus evolves. Science, 319(5865), 909-910.
50. Levy, D. M. (2002). Robust institutions. The Review of Austrian Economics, 15(2-3), 131-142.
51. List, J. A. (2011). Does market experience eliminate market anomalies? The case of exogenous market experience. NBER working paper 16908. Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research.
52. List, J. A., & Millimet, D. L. (2008). The market: Catalyst for rationality and filter of irrationality. The B. E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 8(1), Article 47.
53. Mitchell, G. (2004). Libertarian paternalism is an oxymoron. Northwestern University Law Review, 99(3), 1245-1277.
54. Mueller, D. C. (2003). Public choice III. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
55. Pennington, M. (2011). Robust political economy: Classical liberalism and the future of public policy. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
56. Pierson, P. (2004). Politics in time: History, institutions, and social analysis. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
57. Rizzo, M. J., & Whitman, D. G. (2009a). Little brother is watching you: New paternalism on the slippery slopes. Arizona Law Review, 51(3), 685-739.
58. Rizzo, M. J., & Whitman, D. G. (2009b). The knowledge problem of the new paternalism. Brigham Young University Law Review, 4, 905-968.
59. Schumpeter, J. A. (1942/1994). Capitalism, socialism, and democracy. London: Routledge.
60. Simon, H. A. (1955). A behavioral model of rational choice. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 69(1), 99-118.
61. Smith, A. (1759). The theory of moral sentiments. London: A. Millar.
62. Smith, V. L. (2000). Rational choice: the contrast between economics and psychology. In Bargaining and market behavior: Essays in experimental economics (pp. 7-24). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
63. Stigler, G. J. (1982). The economist as preacher and other essays. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
64. Sugden, R. (2009). Why incoherent preferences do not justify paternalism. Constitutional Political Economy, 19(3), 226-248.
65. Sunstein, C. R., & Tahler, R. H. (2003). Libertarian paternalism is not an oxymoron. The University of Chicago Law Review, 70(4), 1159-1202.
66. Tasic, S. (2011). Are regulators rational? Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, 17(1), article 3.
67. Thaler, R. H., & Sunstein, C. R. (2003). Libertarian paternalism. The American Economic Review, 93(2), 175-179.
68. Thaler, R. H., & Sunstein, C. R. (2009). Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth and happiness. New Haven: Yale University Press.
69. Vis, B., & van Kersbergen, K. (2007). Why and how do political actors pursue risky reforms? Journal of Theoretical Politics, 19(2), 153-172.
70. Voigt, S. (2006). Robust political economy: The case of antitrust. The Review of Austrian Economics, 19(2-3), 203-215.
71. von Mises, L. (1966). Human action: A treatise on economics. Chicago: Henry Regnery.
72. Wilkinson, N. (2007). An introduction to behavioral economics. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
73. Wolfers, J. (2007). Are voters irrational? Evidence from gubernatorial elections. Mimeo, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.