Why votes have value: Instrumental voting with overconfidence and overestimation of others' errors

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 84, Issue , 2014, Pages 17-38

  Dittmann, Ingolf ^a   Kübler, Dorothea ^b,c   Maug, Ernst ^d   Mechtenberg, Lydia ^e  

^a ERASMUS UNIVERSITY ROTTERDAM   (Netherlands)

^b WZB BERLIN SOCIAL SCIENCE CENTER   (Germany)

^c TECHNISCHE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN   (Germany)

^d University of Mannheim   (Germany)

^e UNIVERSITY OF HAMBURG   (Germany)

Author keywords

Cognitive biases; Experimental economics; Overconfidence; Pivotality; Voting

Indexed keywords

EID: 84892635528     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.12.004     Document Type: Article

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