The dark side of competition for status

Management Science

Volumn 60, Issue 1, 2014, Pages 38-55

  Charness, Gary ^a   Masclet, David ^b,c   Villeval, Marie Claire ^d,e,f  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITÉ DE RENNES 1   (France)

^c CIRANO   (Canada)

^d UNIVERSITÉ DE LYON   (France)

^e CNRS   (France)

^f IZA   (Germany)

Author keywords

Competitive preferences; Doping; Experiment; Feedback; Ranking; Sabotage; Status

Indexed keywords

COMPETITIVE PREFERENCES; GROUP IDENTITIES; PERFORMANCE RANKINGS; RANKING; RELATIVE PERFORMANCE; SABOTAGE; STATUS;

DOPING (ADDITIVES); EXPERIMENTS; FEEDBACK; MANAGEMENT; MANAGEMENT SCIENCE;

CRIME;

EID: 84893531450     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: 15265501     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2013.1747     Document Type: Article

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