Does government ideology matter in monetary policy? A panel data analysis for OECD countries

Journal of International Money and Finance

Volumn 31, Issue 5, 2012, Pages 1126-1139

  Belke, Ansgar ^a,b,c   Potrafke, Niklas ^d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF DUISBURG ESSEN   (Germany)

^b DIW BERLIN   (Germany)

^c IZA   (Germany)

^d UNIVERSITY OF KONSTANZ   (Germany)

Author keywords

Central bank independence; Government ideology; Monetary policy; Panel data; Partisan politics; Taylor rule

Indexed keywords

EID: 84861678475     PISSN: 02615606     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jimonfin.2011.12.014     Document Type: Article

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