On political representation

British Journal of Political Science

Volumn 29, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 109-127

  Brennan, Geoffrey ^a   Hamlin, Alan ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033483241     PISSN: 00071234     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0007123499000058     Document Type: Article

References (31)

1. For more wide-ranging discussions, see Hanna Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967); Anthony Birch, Representation (London: Pall Mall, 1972); Bernard Manin, The Principles of Representative Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). For classic texts, see Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C. B. McPherson (Harmondsworth, Middx: Penguin, 1968); John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, ed. R. B. McCallum (Oxford: Blackwell, 1946); and Edmund Burke, Edmund Burke on Government, Politics and Society, ed. B. H. Hill (London: Fontana, 1975).
2. For more wide-ranging discussions, see Hanna Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967); Anthony Birch, Representation (London: Pall Mall, 1972); Bernard Manin, The Principles of Representative Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). For classic texts, see Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C. B. McPherson (Harmondsworth, Middx: Penguin, 1968); John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, ed. R. B. McCallum (Oxford: Blackwell, 1946); and Edmund Burke, Edmund Burke on Government, Politics and Society, ed. B. H. Hill (London: Fontana, 1975).
3. For more wide-ranging discussions, see Hanna Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967); Anthony Birch, Representation (London: Pall Mall, 1972); Bernard Manin, The Principles of Representative Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). For classic texts, see Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C. B. McPherson (Harmondsworth, Middx: Penguin, 1968); John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, ed. R. B. McCallum (Oxford: Blackwell, 1946); and Edmund Burke, Edmund Burke on Government, Politics and Society, ed. B. H. Hill (London: Fontana, 1975).
4. For more wide-ranging discussions, see Hanna Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967); Anthony Birch, Representation (London: Pall Mall, 1972); Bernard Manin, The Principles of Representative Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). For classic texts, see Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C. B. McPherson (Harmondsworth, Middx: Penguin, 1968); John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, ed. R. B. McCallum (Oxford: Blackwell, 1946); and Edmund Burke, Edmund Burke on Government, Politics and Society, ed. B. H. Hill (London: Fontana, 1975).
5. For more wide-ranging discussions, see Hanna Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967); Anthony Birch, Representation (London: Pall Mall, 1972); Bernard Manin, The Principles of Representative Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). For classic texts, see Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C. B. McPherson (Harmondsworth, Middx: Penguin, 1968); John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, ed. R. B. McCallum (Oxford: Blackwell, 1946); and Edmund Burke, Edmund Burke on Government, Politics and Society, ed. B. H. Hill (London: Fontana, 1975).
6. For more wide-ranging discussions, see Hanna Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967); Anthony Birch, Representation (London: Pall Mall, 1972); Bernard Manin, The Principles of Representative Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). For classic texts, see Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C. B. McPherson (Harmondsworth, Middx: Penguin, 1968); John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, ed. R. B. McCallum (Oxford: Blackwell, 1946); and Edmund Burke, Edmund Burke on Government, Politics and Society, ed. B. H. Hill (London: Fontana, 1975).
7. For clear statements of the principal - agent approach, see Robert Barro, 'The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model', Public Choice, 14 (1973), 19-42; and Barry Weingast, 'The Congressional-Bureaucratic System: A Principal-Agent Perspective', Public Choice, 44 (1984), 147-92
8. For clear statements of the principal - agent approach, see Robert Barro, 'The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model', Public Choice, 14 (1973), 19-42; and Barry Weingast, 'The Congressional-Bureaucratic System: A Principal-Agent Perspective', Public Choice, 44 (1984), 147-92
9. There are also important questions involved in the fact that the principals are plural. The identification, from an unavoidably multiple set of individual preferences over social states, of a single collective preference that is 'representative' of the plurality has been the central concern of post-Arrow social choice theory. We do not wish to deny these difficulties, but equally we do not see them as implying that the idea of an aggregate citizenry interest is totally meaningless.
10. More detailed discussion of second-best arguments will be presented in Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin, Democratic Devices and Desires (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
11. The broader attempt is the subject of Brennan and Hamlin, Democratic Devices and Desires.
12. For discussion of Condorcet's argument, and relevant translations, see Iain McLean and Fiona Hewitt, Condorcet: Foundations of Social Choice and Political Theory (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1994); Keith Baker, Condorcet: From Natural Philosophy to Social Mathematics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975). Madison's argument is laid out in J. Cooke, ed., The Federalist (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1961, particularly Federalist Paper No. 10), and discussed in Stephen Elkin, 'Madison and After: The American Model of Political Constitution', Political Studies, 44 (1996), 592-604. Schumpeter's argument is presented in chap. 22 of Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1943).
13. For discussion of Condorcet's argument, and relevant translations, see Iain McLean and Fiona Hewitt, Condorcet: Foundations of Social Choice and Political Theory (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1994); Keith Baker, Condorcet: From Natural Philosophy to Social Mathematics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975). Madison's argument is laid out in J. Cooke, ed., The Federalist (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1961, particularly Federalist Paper No. 10), and discussed in Stephen Elkin, 'Madison and After: The American Model of Political Constitution', Political Studies, 44 (1996), 592-604. Schumpeter's argument is presented in chap. 22 of Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1943).
14. For discussion of Condorcet's argument, and relevant translations, see Iain McLean and Fiona Hewitt, Condorcet: Foundations of Social Choice and Political Theory (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1994); Keith Baker, Condorcet: From Natural Philosophy to Social Mathematics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975). Madison's argument is laid out in J. Cooke, ed., The Federalist (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1961, particularly Federalist Paper No. 10), and discussed in Stephen Elkin, 'Madison and After: The American Model of Political Constitution', Political Studies, 44 (1996), 592-604. Schumpeter's argument is presented in chap. 22 of Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1943).
15. For discussion of Condorcet's argument, and relevant translations, see Iain McLean and Fiona Hewitt, Condorcet: Foundations of Social Choice and Political Theory (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1994); Keith Baker, Condorcet: From Natural Philosophy to Social Mathematics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975). Madison's argument is laid out in J. Cooke, ed., The Federalist (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1961, particularly Federalist Paper No. 10), and discussed in Stephen Elkin, 'Madison and After: The American Model of Political Constitution', Political Studies, 44 (1996), 592-604. Schumpeter's argument is presented in chap. 22 of Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1943).
16. For discussion of Condorcet's argument, and relevant translations, see Iain McLean and Fiona Hewitt, Condorcet: Foundations of Social Choice and Political Theory (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1994); Keith Baker, Condorcet: From Natural Philosophy to Social Mathematics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975). Madison's argument is laid out in J. Cooke, ed., The Federalist (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1961, particularly Federalist Paper No. 10), and discussed in Stephen Elkin, 'Madison and After: The American Model of Political Constitution', Political Studies, 44 (1996), 592-604. Schumpeter's argument is presented in chap. 22 of Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1943).
17. James Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1991).
18. Madison, Federalist, No. 10.
19. Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1956).
20. Empirical evidence on this point is plentiful and generally supports the idea of (rational) ignorance. Some of this evidence is reviewed in Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation, chap. 6 (since Fishkin does not work within the rational actor paradigm, he does not discuss rational ignorance); and in Geoffrey Brennan and Loren Lomasky, Democracy and Decision (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), chap. 7.
21. Empirical evidence on this point is plentiful and generally supports the idea of (rational) ignorance. Some of this evidence is reviewed in Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation, chap. 6 (since Fishkin does not work within the rational actor paradigm, he does not discuss rational ignorance); and in Geoffrey Brennan and Loren Lomasky, Democracy and Decision (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), chap. 7.
22. See Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin, 'Rationalizing Parliamentary Systems', Australian Journal of Political Science, 28 (1993), 443-57.
23. Particularly in Brennan and Lomasky, Democracy and Decision.
24. We discuss some of the implications of expressive voting - and consider the possibility of 'mixed' instrumental and expressive voting - in Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin, 'Expressive Voting and Electoral Equilibrium', Public Choice (in press).
25. See Brennan and Lomasky, Democracy and Decision, chap. 7; and Dennis Mueller, Public Choice II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), chap. 18, for overviews of this literature.
26. See Brennan and Lomasky, Democracy and Decision, chap. 7; and Dennis Mueller, Public Choice II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), chap. 18, for overviews of this literature.
27. We discuss the more general claims elsewhere: Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin, 'Constitutional Political Economy: The Political Philosophy of Homo Economicus?', Journal of Political Philosophy, 3 (1995), 280-303; Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin, 'Economizing on Virtue', Constitutional Political Economy, 6 (1995), 35-56. Here we are concerned only with the application to representation.
28. We discuss the more general claims elsewhere: Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin, 'Constitutional Political Economy: The Political Philosophy of Homo Economicus?', Journal of Political Philosophy, 3 (1995), 280-303; Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin, 'Economizing on Virtue', Constitutional Political Economy, 6 (1995), 35-56. Here we are concerned only with the application to representation.
29. In Brennan and Hamlin, 'Constitutional Political Economy'.
30. Condorcet's own defence of representation is built on this argument with 'enlightenment' playing the key role. See fn. 6 for references.
31. For a discussion of the selection of politicians by moral character which stresses the possibility that the relevant characters may not always be likeable, see Bernard Williams, 'Politics and Moral Character', in Stuart Hampshire, ed., Public and Private Morality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978).