A reduced-form approach to behavioral public finance

Annual Review of Economics

Volumn 4, Issue , 2012, Pages 511-540

  Mullainathan, Sendhi ^a,b   Schwartzstein, Joshua ^c   Congdon, William J ^d  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Office of Financial Protection for Older Americans   (United States)

^c Dartmouth College   (United States)

^d BROOKINGS INSTITUTION   (United States)

Author keywords

behavioral economics; externalities; social insurance; taxation

Indexed keywords

EID: 84873187227     PISSN: 19411383     EISSN: 19411391     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev-economics-111809-125033     Document Type: Article

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