Expressive political behaviour: Foundations, scope and implications

British Journal of Political Science

Volumn 41, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 645-670

  Hamlin, Alan ^a   Jennings, Colin ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF STRATHCLYDE   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79959313484     PISSN: 00071234     EISSN: 14692112     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0007123411000020     Document Type: Article

References (112)

1. For detailed statements of the basic expressive idea, see Geoffrey Brennan and Loren Lomasky, Democracy and Decision (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993);
2. Alexander A. Schuessler, A Logic of Expressive Choice (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000).
3. An alternative response to the difficulty of the expected utility-maximizing model is suggested by John A. Ferejohn and Morris P. Fiorina, 'The Paradox of Not Voting: A Decision Theoretic Analysis', American Political Science Review, 68 (1974), 525-36.
4. For empirical analyses of the correlation between general expressive behaviour and voting, see Cassandra Copeland and David N. Laband, 'Expressiveness and Voting', Public Choice, 110 (2002), 351-63; (Pubitemid 37133505)
5. David N. Laband, Ram Pandit, Anne M. Lebland and John P. Sophocleus, 'Pigskins and Politics: Linking Expressive Behavior and Voting', Journal of Sports Economics, 9 (2008), 553;
6. And David N. Laband, Ram Pandit, John P. Sophocleus and Anne M. Lebland, 'Patriotism, Pigskins, and Politics: An Empirical Examination of Expressive Behavior and Voting', Public Choice, 138 (2009), 97-108.
7. Arye L. Hillman, 'Expressive Behaviour in Economics and Politics', European Journal of Political Economy, 26 (2010), 403-18, identifies material utility, expressive utility and interdependent utility (that is, utility dependent on other individuals) as the components of overall utility.
8. See Amrita Dhillon and Susana Peralta, 'Economic Theories of Voter Turnout', Economic Journal, 112 (2002), 332-52;
9. Timothy J. Feddersen, 'Rational Choice Theory and the Paradox of Not Voting', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 18 (2004), 99-112; (Pubitemid 43568550)
10. Keith Dowding, 'Is It Rational to Vote? Five Types of Answer and a Suggestion', British Journal of Politics & International Relations, 7 (2005), 442-59;
11. And Benny Geys, ' "Rational" Theories of Voter Turnout: A Review', Political Studies Review, 4 (2006), 16-35.
12. For critical discussion, see Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1994)
13. And Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
14. The essence of these criticisms is that the inclusion of non- instrumental terms in the analysis may render it tautological and unable to generate testable predictions. (F'note continued) Dowding, 'Is It Rational to Vote?', argues that these criticisms are unfair, but that the 'desire for deeper reasons' to be provided is nevertheless justified. An early discussion of expressive choice is to be found in James M. Buchanan, 'Individual Choice in Voting and the Market', Journal of Political Economy, 62 (1954), 334-43.
15. Discussions of expressive choice and voting are to be found in William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook, 'A Theory of the Calculus of Voting', American Political Science Review, 62 (1968), 25-42, who focus on duty;
16. Gordon Tullock, 'The Charity of the Uncharitable', Western Economic Journal, 9 (1971), 379-92
17. and Robert E. Goodin and Kevin W. S. Roberts, 'The Ethical Voter', American Political Science Review, 69 (1975), 926-8, who focus on ethical voting.
18. Morris P. Fiorina, 'The Voting Decision: Instrumental and Expressive Aspects', Journal of Politics, 38 (1976), 390-415, who links expressive voting to party allegiance.
19. Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan, 'Voter Choice: Evaluating Political Alternatives', American Behavioral Scientist, 28 (1984), 185-201, discuss expressive voting in more general terms and focus on the problems it causes for the normative evaluation of political outcomes.
20. For simplicity, we focus on net benefits so as to avoid separate discussion of the classification of costs. Nothing significant hangs on this. Examples include such things as the provision of private benefits such as discounts on insurance or access to sporting facilities to incentivize membership of trade unions. To be a 'Z-performer' as Schuessler puts it (Schuessler, A Logic of Expressive Choice, p. 54). Although we must recognize that some writers do not use the terms 'instrumental' and 'expressive' in this way, but rather seem to use 'instrumental' to identify what we have termed the 'all-things-considered' choice. Of course, one can always add special features to the example: perhaps I am concerned not to cry out because it may wake a sleeping child; but while such additional features may make the possibility of my crying out relevant, this relevance is achieved by adding further instrumental detail rather than focusing on the expressive aspect of the cry.
21. See Brennan and Lomasky, Democracy and Decision;
22. Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin, Democratic Devices and Desires (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000);
23. Geoffrey Brennan, 'Psychological Dimensions in Voter Choice', Public Choice, 137 (2008), 475-89.
24. Of course, there is also the possibility that the relationship between instrumental and expressive considerations in the all-things- considered evaluation is lexicographic or incommensurable in some way. This possibility is explored in Nicholas Baigent, 'Preferences for Acts and Choice Functions on Outcomes' (London: LSE Choice Group, 2011).
25. This would locate voting within a more general 'economics of low-cost decisions' as discussed by Gebhard Kirchgassner, 'Towards a Theory of Low-Cost Decisions', European Journal of Political Economy, 8 (1992), 305-20.
26. See also Hartmut Kliemt, 'The Veil of Insignificance', European Journal of Political Economy, 2/3 (1986), 333-44.
27. See Hillman, 'Expressive Behaviour in Economics and Politics', for a detailed discussion of expressive rhetoric. For a general depiction of the nature of the rhetorical situation
28. see Lloyd F. Bitzer, 'The Rhetorical Situation', Philosophy & Rhetoric, 25 (1992), 1-14.
29. Note that recognizing the expressive target for political rhetoric undermines the idea that such political rhetoric is 'cheap talk', as discussed by Joseph Farrell and Matthew Rabin, 'Cheap Talk', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10 (1996), 103-18. (Pubitemid 126418352)
30. Note that this may be entirely consistent with specifying rational choice in terms of the maximization of a utility function that includes both 'instrumental utility' and 'expressive utility'. Hillman, 'Expressive Behaviour in Economics and Politics', offers one such formulation, using 'material utility' rather than 'instrumental utility'.
31. Also note that specifying 'expressive utility' in this way does not imply that all expressive utility derives from a particular source (for example, the confirmation of identity). See Riker and Ordeshook, 'A Theory of the Calculus of Voting
32. And Philip Jones and John Hudson, 'Civic Duty and Expressive Voting: Is Virtue Its Own Reward?', Kyklos, 53 (2000), 3-16. (Pubitemid 30184301)
33. See, for example, R. Michael Alvarez, Frederick J. Boehmke, and Jonathan Nagler, 'Strategic Voting in British Elections', Electoral Studies, 25 (2006), 1-19. (Pubitemid 43285717)
34. Brennan, 'Psychological Dimensions in Voter Choice'.
35. See, for example, George A. Akerlof and Rachel E. Kranton, 'Economics and Identity', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115 (2000), 715-53;
36. George A. Akerlof and Rachel E. Kranton, Identity Economics: How Our Identities Shape Our Work, Wages, and Well-Being (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2010);
37. Amartya K. Sen, Identity and Violence, the Illusion of Destiny (London: Allan Lane, 2006).
38. Hillman, 'Expressive Behaviour in Economics and Politics'.
39. Schuessler, A Logic of Expressive Choice.
40. Julio J. Rotemberg, 'Attitude-Dependent Altruism, Turnout and Voting', Public Choice, 140 (2009), 223-44.
41. Alan Hamlin and Colin Jennings, 'Group Formation and Political Conflict: Instrumental and Expressive Approaches', Public Choice, 118 (2004), 413-35; (Pubitemid 39046159)
42. Alan Hamlin and Colin Jennings, 'Leadership and Conflict', Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 64 (2007), 49-68.
43. Geoffrey Brennan and Philip Pettit, 'The Hidden Economy of Esteem', Economics and Philosophy, 16 (2000), 77-98;
44. Geoffrey Brennan and Philip Pettit, The Economy of Esteem: An Essay on Civil and Political Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
45. Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin, 'Expressive Voting and Electoral Equilibrium', Public Choice, 95 (1998), 149-75.
46. Panu Poutvaara, 'Party Platforms with Endogenous Party Membership', Public Choice, 117 (2003), 79-98, applies the idea of alienation and indifference to party membership decisions prior to elections. (Pubitemid 38118417)
47. Kenneth V. Greene and Phillip J. Nelson, 'If Extremists Vote How Do They Express Themselves? An Empirical Test of an Expressive Theory of Voting', Public Choice, 113 (2002), 425-36. (Pubitemid 37133433)
48. Phillip J. Nelson and Kenneth V. Greene, Signaling Goodness: Social Rules and Public Choice (University of Michigan Press, 2003) provide their own version of expressive choice which is founded on imitative behaviour. This version of expressive voting (similar to Schuessler's) is based on identification with fellow voters rather than with candidates and for that reason they argue that it explains why extremists are not less likely to vote than moderates.
49. Stephen Drinkwater and Colin Jennings, 'Who Are the Expressive Voters?' Public Choice, 132 (2007), 179-89.
50. Peter T. Calcagno and Christopher Westley, 'An Institutional Analysis of Voter Turnout: The Role of Primary Type and the Expressive and Instrumental Voting Hypotheses', Constitutional Political Economy, 19 (2008), 94-110.
51. In an earlier work, Joel M. Guttman, Naftali Hilger and Yochanan Shachmurove, 'Voting as Investment vs. Voting as Consumption: New Evidence', Kyklos, 47 (1994), 197-207, find evidence in the 1976 US presidential election which supports the expressive story that where non-voting occurs, it is more likely due to alienation than to indifference. They find that voting was a function of absolute utility and not utility difference.
52. Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin, 'On Political Representation', British Journal of Political Science, 29 (1999), 109-27.
53. They are developed in Brennan and Hamlin, Democratic Devices and Desires.
54. See also Geoffrey Brennan and Philip Pettit, 'Power Corrupts, but Can Office Ennoble?' Kyklos, 55 (2002), 157-78. (Pubitemid 34536583)
55. For related discussions, see Timothy Besley, Principled Agents? The Political Economy of Good Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
56. See, in particular, Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan, The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of the Fiscal Constitution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980);
57. and Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan, The Reason of Rules (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
58. This link is developed in Brennan and Hamlin, Democratic Devices and Desires;
59. Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin, 'Revisionist Public Choice Theory', New Political Economy, 13 (2008), 77-88;
60. and Alan Hamlin, 'Political Dispositions and Dispositional Politics', in Giuseppe Eusepi and Alan Hamlin, eds, Beyond Conventional Economics: The Limits of Rational Behaviour in Political Decision Making (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2006), pp. 3-16.
61. See Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin, 'Expressive Constitutionalism', Constitutional Political Economy, 13 (2002), 299-311;
62. And Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin, 'Constitutions as Expressive Documents', in Barry R. Weingast and Donald A. Witman, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 329-41.
63. See Richard A. Musgrave, 'Merit Goods', in John Eatwell, Murray Milgate and Peter Newman, eds, The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics (London: Macmillan, 1987), p. 452.
64. For an overview of the literature on merit goods and paternalism, see Arye L. Hillman, Public Finance and Public Policy: Responsibilities and Limitations of Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
65. For an early paper making this point, see Kevin W. S. Roberts, 'Voting over Income Tax Schedules', Journal of Public Economics, 8 (1977), 329-40.
66. see Harold M. Hochman and James D. Rodgers, 'Pareto Optimal Redistribution', American Economic Review, 59 (1969), 542-57.
67. See also Ellen F. Paul, Fred D. Miller Jr and Jeffrey Paul, eds, Altruism (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1993);
68. James Andreoni, 'Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence', Journal of Political Economy, 97 (1989), 1447-58;
69. and James Andreoni, 'Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving', Economic Journal, 100 (1990), 464-77.
70. The argument was set out in Tullock, 'The Charity of the Uncharitable';
71. Geoffrey Brennan, 'Five Rational Actor Accounts of the Welfare State', Kyklos, 54 (2001), 213-33, revisits the argument as one of five accounts explaining the welfare state.
72. See also Russell S. Sobel and Gary A. Wagner, 'Expressive Voting and Government Redistribution: Testing Tullock's "Charity of the Uncharitable" ', Public Choice, 119 (2004), 143-59. (Pubitemid 39080126)
73. Hillman, 'Expressive Behaviour in Economics and Politics'.
74. John R. Carter and Stephen D. Guerette, 'An Experimental Study of Expressive Voting', Public Choice, 73 (1992), 251-60;
75. A. J. Fischer, 'A Further Experimental Study of Expressive Voting', Public Choice, 88 (1996), 171-84.
76. Later papers include: Reiner Eichenberger and Felix Oberholzer-Gee, 'Rational Moralists: The Role of Fairness in Democratic Economic Politics', Public Choice, 94 (1998), 191-210;
77. Timothy J. Feddersen, Sean Gailmard and Alvaro Sandroni, 'Moral Bias in Large Elections: Theory and Experimental Evidence', American Political Science Review, 130 (2009), 175-92;
78. Sobel and Wagner, 'Expressive Voting and Government Redistribution'.
79. See Jean-Robert Tyran, 'Voting When Money and Morals Conflict: An Experimental Test of Expressive Voting', Journal of Public Economics, 88 (2004), 1645-64, where the argument could be viewed as complementary to the idea that expressiveness may help to explain high levels of turnout even where the margin of victory is large. (Pubitemid 38102635)
80. Empirical evidence for this is provided by John Ashworth, Benny Geys and Bruno Heyndels, 'Everyone Likes a Winner: An Empirical Test of the Effect of Electoral Closeness on Turnout in a Context of Expressive Voting', Public Choice, 128 (2006), 383-405 (Pubitemid 44372861)
81. And by Stephen Coate, Michael Conlin and Andrea Moro, 'The Performance of Pivotal-Voter Models in Small-Scale Elections: Evidence from Texas Liquor Referenda', Journal of Public Economics, 92 (2008), 582-96.
82. Of course, we might also identify cases in which market choice may be distorted, perhaps by informational asymmetry and practices such as advertising. Timur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995).
83. This more general approach to political collective action and expressiveness is explored in Philip Jones, ' "All for One and One for All": Transactions Cost and Collective Action', Political Studies, 52 (2004), 450-68; (Pubitemid 39436421)
84. And Philip Jones, 'The Logic of Expressive Collective Action: When Will Individuals "Nail Their Colours to the Mast"?' British Journal of Politics & International Relations, 9 (2007), 564-81. (Pubitemid 47604270)
85. Bryan Caplan, The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007).
86. Caplan argues that these biases can be seen in four main areas: an anti-market bias, an anti-foreign bias, a make-work bias and a pessimistic bias. Caplan, The Myth of the Rational Voter, pp. 138-9.
87. Philip Jones and Peter Dawson, 'How Much Do Voters Know? An Analysis of Motivation and Political Awareness', Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 55 (2008), 123-42, in a study of Britain, find that voters are better informed than non-voters.
88. George A. Akerlof, 'The Economics of Illusion', Economics &Politics, 1 (1989), 1-15.
89. See also Fiorina, 'The Voting Decision'
90. and Tyler Cowen, 'Self-Deception as the Root of Political Failure', Public Choice, 124 (2005), 437-51 (Pubitemid 41433501)
91. on the same theme. See Amihai Glazer, 'An Expressive Theory of Voting on Strikes', Economic Inquiry, 30 (1992), 733-41, on expressiveness and strikes.
92. Hamlin and Jennings, in 'Group Formation and Political Conflict' and in 'Leadership and Conflict', discuss group conflict and the potential role for the expressive selection of group leaders who are willing to engage in conflict. See also Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin, 'The European Constitution and Peace: Taking the Heat out of Politics', in Charles Blankart and Dennis Mueller, eds, A Constitution for the European Union (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2004), 1-23;
93. and Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin, 'Nationalism and Federalism: The Political Constitution of Peace', in Gianluigi Galeotti, Pierre Salmon and Ronald Wintrobe, eds, Competition and Structure: The Political Economy of Collective Decisions: Essays in Honor of Albert Breton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 259-83.
94. William H. Kaempfer and Anton D. Lowenberg, 'The Theory of International Economic Sanctions: A Public Choice Approach', American Economic Review, 78 (1988), 786-93.
95. See Gokhan R. Karahan and William F. Shughart II, 'Under Two Flags: Symbolic Voting in the State of Mississippi', Public Choice, 118 (2004), 105-24, for an analysis of expressive voting and flags. (Pubitemid 39046172)
96. Amihai Glazer, 'Voting to Anger and to Please Others', Public Choice, 134 (2008), 247-54.
97. Jean-Robert Tyran and Dirk Engelmann, 'To Buy or Not to Buy? An Experimental Study of Consumer Boycotts in Retail Markets', Economica, 72 (2005), 1-16. (Pubitemid 40318668)
98. Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, 'Inefficient Redistribution', American Political Science Review, 95 (2001), 649-61. (Pubitemid 33586500)
99. See also Gordon Tullock, The Economics of Special Privilege and Rent Seeking (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989);
100. and Stephen Coate and Stephen Morris, 'On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests', Journal of Political Economy, 103 (1995), 1210-35, on 'sneaky' transfers.
101. See Colin Jennings, 'The Good, the Bad and the Populist: A Model of Political Agency and Emotional Voting' (University of Strathclyde, Department of Economics Working Paper (University of Strathclyde, 2009) for an analysis of populism and expressive voting in the context of a political agency model.
102. Kliemt, 'The Veil of Insignificance';
103. Joel M. Guttman, 'Can Political Entrepreneurs Solve the Free- Rider Problem?' Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 3 (1982), 357-66.
104. Hillman, 'Expressive Behaviour in Economics and Politics', focuses on what he terms 'expressive policy traps'.
105. James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962);
106. Brennan and Buchanan, The Reason of Rules.
107. Brennan and Hamlin, Democratic Devices and Desires.
108. Brennan and Hamlin, 'Expressive Constitutionalism'.
109. Eric Crampton and Andrew Farrant, 'Expressive and Instrumental Voting: The Scylla and Charybdis of Constitutional Political Economy', Constitutional Political Economy, 15 (2004), 77-88.
110. Brennan and Hamlin, 'Constitutions as Expressive Documents'.
111. Colin Jennings, 'Political Leadership, Conflict and the Prospects for Constitutional Peace', Economics of Governance, 8 (2007), 83-94. (Pubitemid 44729143)
112. Besley, Principled Agents? Timothy Besley, 'Political Selection', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19 (2005), 43-60. (Pubitemid 41634737)