Choosing a future based on the past: Institutions, behavior, and path dependence

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 40, Issue , 2015, Pages 312-332

  Bednar, Jenna ^a   Jones Rooy, Andrea ^b   Page, Scott E ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

^b NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SHANGHAI   (China)

Author keywords

Agent based models; Behavioral spillovers; Computational modeling; Culture; Development; Institutional sequencing

Indexed keywords

EID: 84962751034     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2015.09.004     Document Type: Article

References (64)

1. Akerlof G., Shiller R. Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the Economy, and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism 2009, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
2. Arfi B. "Spontaneous" Interethnic Order: The Emergence of Collective, Path-Dependent Cooperation. Int. Stud. Q 2000, 44(4):563-590.
3. Barber G.M. Sequencing highway network improvements: a case study of South Sulawesi. Econ. Geogr. 1977, 53:55-69.
4. Bednar J., Page S.E. Can game(s) theory explain culture? The emergence of cultural behavior within multiple games. Ration. Soc. 2007, 19:65-97.
5. Bednar, J., Page S.E., 2014. When order affects performance: Institutional sequencing, cultural sway, and behavioral path dependence. Unpublished manuscript.
6. Bednar J., Bramson A., Jones-Rooy A., Page S.E. Emergent cultural signatures and persistent diversity: a model of conformity and consistency. Ration. Soc. 2010, 22:407-444.
7. Bednar J., Page S.E., Toole J. Revised-path dependence. Polit. Anal. 2012, 20:146-156.
8. Bednar J., Chen Y., Liu T.X., Page S.E. Behavioral spillovers and cognitive load in multiple games: an experimental study. Games Econ. Behav. 2012, 74:12-31.
9. Bendor J., Diermeier D., Ting M. A behavioral model of turnout. Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 2003, 97:261-280.
10. Boeker W. Strategic change: the effects of founding and history. Acad. Manag. J. 1989, 32:484-515.
11. Brady H.E., Sniderman P.M. Attitude attribution: a group basis for political reasoning. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 1985, 79:1061-1078.
12. Brent E., Granberg D. Subjective agreement with the presidential candidates of 1976 and 1980. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 1982, 42:393-403.
13. Camerer C. Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments on Strategic Interaction 2003, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
14. Cason T.N., Savikhin A.C., Sheremeta R.M. Behavioral spillovers in coordination games. Eur. Econ. Rev. 2012, 56:233-245.
15. Clark A. Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again 1997, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
16. Cohen M.D., Bacdayan P. Organizational routines are stored as procedural memory: evidence from a laboratory study. Organ. Sci. 1994, 5:554-568.
17. Diermeier D., Krehbiel K. Institutionalism as methodology. J. Theor. Polit. 2003, 15:123-144.
18. Dolan P., Galizzi M.M. Like ripples on a pond: behavioral spillovers and their consequences for research and policy. J. Econ. Psychol. 2015, 47:1-16.
19. Dollar D., Svensson J. What explains the success or failure of structural adjustment programmes?. Econ. J. 2000, 110:894-917.
20. Fearon J., Laitin D. Explaining interethnic cooperation. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 1996, 90:715-735.
21. Fernández R., Fogli A. Fertility: the role of culture and family experience. J. Eur. Econ. Assoc. 2006, 4:552-561.
22. Fish M.S. Democracy from Scratch: Opposition and Regime in the New Russian Revolution 1995, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
23. Fudenberg D., Levine D. The Theory of Learning in Games 1998, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
24. Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox 2002, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. G. Gigerenzer, R. Selten (Eds.).
25. Gilboa I., Schmeidler D. Case-based decision theory. Q. J. Econ. 1995, 110:605-639.
26. Golman R., Page S.E. Basins of attraction and equilibrium selection under different learning rules. Evol. Econ. 2010, 20:49-72.
27. Greif A. Cultural beliefs and the organization of society: a historical and theoretical reflection on collectivist and individualist societies. J. Polit. Econ. 1994, 102:912-950.
28. Greif A. Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy 2006, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
29. Greif A., Laitin D. A theory of endogenous institutional change. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 2004, 98:633-652.
30. Grzymala-Busse A. The best laid plans: the impact of informal rules on formal institutions in transitional regimes. Stud. Comp. Int. Dev. 2010, 45:311-333.
31. Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence in Fifteen Small-Scale Societies 2004, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. J. Henrich, R. Boyd, S. Bowles, H. Gintis, E. Fehr, C. Camerer (Eds.).
32. Henrich J., Ensminger J., McElreath R., Barr A., Barrett C., Bolyanatz A., Cardenas J.C., Gurven M., Gwako E., Henrich N., Lesorogol C., Marlowe F., Tracer D., Ziker J. Markets, religion, community size, and the evolution of fairness and punishment. Science 2010, 327:1480-1484.
33. Hershatter G. The gender of memory: rural Chinese women and the 1950s. Signs J. Women Cult. Soc. 2002, 28:43-70.
34. Holbrook D., Cohen W.M., Hounshell D.A., Klepper S. The nature, sources, and consequences of firm differences in the early history of the semiconductor industry. Strateg. Manag. J. 2000, 21:1017-1041.
35. Hurwicz L. On informationally decentralized systems. Decision and Organization: A Volume in Honor of Jacob Marschak 1972, 297-336. North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam. C.B. McGuire, R. Radner (Eds.).
36. Hurwicz L., Schmeidler D. Construction of outcome functions guaranteeing existence and Pareto-optimality of Nash equilibria. Econometrica 1978, 46:1447-1474.
37. Kahneman D., Tversky A. Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica 1979, 47:263-292.
38. Kalai E., Stanford W. Finite rationality and interpersonal complexity in repeated games. Econometrica 1988, 56:397-410.
39. Karl T. The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States 1997, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA.
40. Medin D., Bennis W., Chandler M. The home-field disadvantage. Perspect. Psychol. Sci. 2010, 5:708-713.
41. Miller J.H., Page S.E. Complex Adaptive Systems: An Introduction to Computational Models of Social Life 2007, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
42. Mondak J.J., McCurley C. Cognitive efficiency and the congressional vote: the psychology of coattail voting. Pol. Res. Q. 1994, 47:151-175.
43. Morton R., Williams K. Experimental Political Science and the Study of Causality: From Nature to the Lab 2010, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
44. Nisbett R.E., Peng K., Choi I., Norenzayan A. Culture and systems of thought: holistic versus analytic cognition?. Psychol. Rev. 2001, 108:291-310.
45. Ostrom E. Understanding Institutional Diversity 2005, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
46. Ostrom E., Janssen M.A., Anderies J.M. Going beyond panaceas. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 2007, 104:15176-15178.
47. Ottati Victor C. Determinants of political judgments: the joint influence of normative and heuristic rules of inference. Polit. Behav. 1990, 12:159-179.
48. Page S.E. Essay: path dependence. Q. J. Pol. Sci. 2006, 1:87-115.
49. Page S.E. A complexity perspective on institutional design. Polit. Philos. Econ. 2012, 11:5-25.
50. Pierson P. Path dependence, increasing returns, and the study of politics. Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 2000, 94:251-267.
51. Pierson Paul Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis 2004, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
52. Platteau J.P. Institutions, Social Norms and Economic Development 2000, Routledge Press, New York, NY.
53. Putnam R.D. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy 1993, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
54. 2 welfare economics. Am. Econ. Rev. 1977, 67:226-234.
55. Roth A.E., Prasnikar V., Okuno-Fujiwara M., Zamir S. Bargaining and market behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: an experimental study. Am. Econ. Rev. 1991, 81:1068-1095.
56. Rubinstein A. Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma. J. Econ. Theory 1986, 39:83-96.
57. Saks M.J., Kidd R.F. Human information processing and adjudication: trial by heuristics. Law Soc. Rev. 1980-1981, 15:123-160.
58. Simpson B. Social values, subjective transformations, and cooperation in social dilemmas. Soc. Psychol. Q. 2004, 67:385-395.
59. Smith V. Constructivist and ecological rationality in economics. Am. Econ. Rev. 2003, 93:465-508.
60. Stiglitz J.E. Globalization and Its Discontents 2003, W.W. Norton and Company, New York, NY.
61. Stinchcombe A.L. Social structure and organizations. Handbook of Organizations 1965, 229-259. Rand McNally, Chicago, IL. J.G. March (Ed.).
62. Swaminathan A. Environmental conditions at founding and organizational mortality: a trial by fire model. Acad. Manag. J. 1996, 39:1350-1385.
63. Tsebelis G. Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics 1990, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA.
64. Vriend N.J. An illustration of the essential difference between individual and social learning, and its consequences for computational analyses. J. Econ. Dyn. Control. 2000, 24:1-19.