Voting when money and morals conflict: An experimental test of expressive voting

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 88, Issue 7-8, 2004, Pages 1645-1664

  Tyran, Jean Robert ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ST GALLEN   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Expressive voting; Low cost theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 0347759816     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(03)00016-1     Document Type: Article

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