Rational Irrationality and the Political Process of Repeal: The Women's Organization for National Prohibition Reform and the 21st Amendment

Kyklos

Volumn 66, Issue 1, 2013, Pages 130-152

  Thomas, Michael D ^a   Thomas, Diana W ^a   Snow, Nicholas A ^a,b  

^a UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM; PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION; SOCIAL THEORY; THEORETICAL STUDY; WOMENS ORGANIZATION;

EID: 84872155383     PISSN: 00235962     EISSN: 14676435     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/kykl.12014     Document Type: Article

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