Straight choices: The psychology of decision making

Straight Choices: The Psychology of Decision Making

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 1-252

  Newell, Benjamin R ^a   Lagnado, David A ^b   Shanks, David R ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES   (Australia)

^b UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84917122449     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9780203960837     Document Type: Book

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