Comparison of confirmation measures

Cognition

Volumn 103, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 107-119

  Tentori, Katya ^a   Crupi, Vincenzo ^a,c   Bonini, Nicolao ^a   Osherson, Daniel ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TRENTO   (Italy)

^b PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c AIX MARSEILLE UNIVERSITY   (France)

Author keywords

Bayesian confirmation measures; Belief updating; Evidential support; Inductive reasoning

Indexed keywords

ADULT; ARTICLE; BAYES THEOREM; CONTROLLED STUDY; DECISION MAKING; EVIDENCE BASED PRACTICE; FEMALE; HUMAN; HUMAN EXPERIMENT; HYPOTHESIS; INFORMATION; INTUITION; MALE; NORMAL HUMAN; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PROBABILITY; PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECT; STANDARD;

BAYES THEOREM; CULTURE; HUMANS; JUDGMENT; MODELS, PSYCHOLOGICAL;

EID: 33846866525     PISSN: 00100277     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2005.09.006     Document Type: Article

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