Probability judgment in hierarchical learning: A conflict between predictiveness and coherence

Cognition

Volumn 83, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 81-112

  Lagnado, David A ^a   Shanks, David R ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Associative learning; Conjunction fallacy; Frequency format; Hierarchical structure; Probability judgment

Indexed keywords

COMPUTER SIMULATION; DIAGNOSIS; DISEASES; RESEARCH;

PROBABILITY JUDGEMENT;

LEARNING SYSTEMS;

ARTICLE; ASSOCIATION; CONTROLLED STUDY; DECISION MAKING; DIAGNOSTIC TEST; DISEASE CLASSIFICATION; FREQUENCY ANALYSIS; HUMAN; HUMAN EXPERIMENT; LEARNING; MODEL; PREDICTION; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PROBABILITY; SYMPTOMATOLOGY; TASK PERFORMANCE;

ADULT; ASSOCIATION LEARNING; COMMON COLD; CONFLICT (PSYCHOLOGY); DIAGNOSIS, DIFFERENTIAL; FEMALE; HUMANS; INFLUENZA, HUMAN; JUDGMENT; MALE; PROBABILITY LEARNING; PROBLEM SOLVING;

EID: 0036158832     PISSN: 00100277     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0010-0277(01)00168-8     Document Type: Article

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