Separate neural systems value immediate and delayed monetary rewards

Science

Volumn 306, Issue 5695, 2004, Pages 503-507

  McClure, Samuel M ^a   Laibson, David I ^b   Loewenstein, George ^c   Cohen, Jonathan D ^a,d  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^d UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH SCHOOL OF MEDICINE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DECISION MAKING; DELAY CIRCUITS; MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING;

MIDBRAIN DOPAMINE SYSTEMS; PARALIMBIC CORTEX; PREFRONTAL CORTEX;

NEURAL NETWORKS;

ANTHROPOLOGY;

ARTICLE; BRAIN DEVELOPMENT; BRAIN FUNCTION; DOPAMINERGIC SYSTEM; LIMBIC SYSTEM; MESENCEPHALON; NUCLEAR MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING; PARIETAL LOBE; PREFRONTAL CORTEX; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PSYCHOLOGY; REWARD;

ADULT; BASAL GANGLIA; BRAIN MAPPING; DECISION MAKING; DOPAMINE; FEMALE; FRONTAL LOBE; HUMANS; LIMBIC SYSTEM; MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING; MALE; PARIETAL LOBE; PREFRONTAL CORTEX; REWARD; TIME FACTORS;

EID: 5144224271     PISSN: 00368075     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1126/science.1100907     Document Type: Article

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49. We thank K. D'Ardenne, L. Nystrom, and J. Lee for help with the experiment and J. Schooler for inspiring discussions in the early planning phases of this work. This work was supported by NIH grants MH132804 (J.D.C), MH065214 (S.M.M.), National Institute on Aging grant AG05842 (D.I.L.), and NSF grant SES-0099025 (D.I.L).