The plurality of Bayesian measures of confirmation and the problem of measure sensitivity

Philosophy of Science

Volumn 66, Issue 3 SUPPL. 1, 1999, Pages

  Fitelson, Branden ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 24944551442     PISSN: 00318248     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/392738     Document Type: Article

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