Typical versus atypical unpacking and superadditive probability judgment

Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning Memory and Cognition

Volumn 30, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 573-582

  Sloman, Steven ^a   Wisniewski, Edward ^b   Rottenstreich, Yuval ^c,f   Hadjichristidis, Constantinos ^d   Fox, Craig R ^e,g  

^a BROWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT GREENSBORO   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

^d UNIVERSITY OF PLYMOUTH   (United Kingdom)

^e UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^f UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

^g UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; DECISION MAKING; HUMAN; PROBABILITY; PSYCHOLOGICAL MODEL; PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY;

HUMANS; JUDGMENT; MODELS, PSYCHOLOGICAL; PROBABILITY; PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY;

EID: 2442452477     PISSN: 02787393     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1037/0278-7393.30.3.573     Document Type: Article

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