Subjective confidence and the sampling of knowledge

Information Sampling and Adaptive Cognition

Volumn , Issue , 2005, Pages 153-182

  Klayman, Joshua ^a   Soll, Jack B ^b   Juslin, Peter ^c   Winman, Anders ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

^b INSEAD   (France)

^c UPPSALA UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84926099671     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511614576.008     Document Type: Chapter

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