Unpacking, Repacking, and Anchoring: Advances in Support Theory

Psychological Review

Volumn 104, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 406-415

  Rottenstreich, Yuval ^a   Tversky, Amos ^b  

^a CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; DECISION MAKING; HUMAN; INTUITION; PHYSIOLOGY; PROBABILITY; PSYCHOLOGICAL MODEL;

HUMANS; INTUITION; JUDGMENT; MODELS, PSYCHOLOGICAL; PROBABILITY;

EID: 0031112849     PISSN: 0033295X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1037/0033-295X.104.2.406     Document Type: Article

References (16)

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