Probability judgement from the inside and out

Evolution and the Psychology of Thinking: The Debate

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 145-169

  Sloman, Steven A ^a   Over, David E ^b  

^a BROWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SUNDERLAND   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042435449     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9780203641606     Document Type: Chapter

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