Matching, allocation, and exchange of discrete resources

Handbook of Social Economics

Volumn 1, Issue 1 B, 2011, Pages 781-852

  Sönmez, Tayfun ^a   Ünver, M Utku ^a  

^a BOSTON COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

Deferred acceptance; House allocation; Housing market; Kidney exchange; Market design; Matching; On campus Housing; School choicecollege Admissions; Student placement; Top trading cycles

Indexed keywords

EID: 84872400999     PISSN: 15706435     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/B978-0-444-53187-2.00017-6     Document Type: Chapter

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