The probabilistic serial mechanism with private endowments

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 69, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 475-491

  Yilmaz, Özgür ^a  

^a KOÇ UNIVERSITY   (Turkey)

Author keywords

No justified envy; Ordinal efficiency; Random assignment; Simultaneous eating algorithm

Indexed keywords

EID: 77953539841     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2010.01.001     Document Type: Article

References (27)

1. Abdulkadiroĝlu Atila, Sönmez Tayfun Random serial dictatorship and the core from random endowments in house allocation problems. Econometrica 1998, 66:689-701.
2. Abdulkadiroĝlu Atila, Sönmez Tayfun House allocation with existing tenants. J. Econ. Theory 1999, 88:233-260.
3. Abdulkadiroĝlu Atila, Sönmez Tayfun Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments. J. Econ. Theory 2003, 112:157-172.
4. Abdulkadiroĝlu Atila, Sönmez Tayfun School choice: A mechanism design approach. Amer. Econ. Rev. 2003, 93:729-747.
5. Birkhoff Garrett Tres observaciones sobre el algebra lineal. Univ. Nac. Tucuman Rev. Ser. A 1946, 5:147-151.
6. Bogomolnaia Anna, Moulin Hervé A new solution to the random assignment problem. J. Econ. Theory 2001, 100:295-328.
7. Bogomolnaia Anna, Moulin Hervé A simple random assignment problem with a unique solution. Econ. Theory 2002, 19:623-636.
8. Crès Hérve, Moulin Hervé Scheduling with opting out: Improving upon random priority. Operations Res. 2001, 49:565-576.
9. Gale David A theorem on flows in networks. Pacific J. Math. 1957, 7:1073-1082.
10. Hylland Aanund, Zeckhauser Richard J. The efficient allocation of individuals to positions. J. Polit. Economy 1979, 87:293-314.
11. Kesten Onur Why do popular mechanisms lack efficiency in random environments?. J. Econ. Theory 2009, 144:2209-2226.
12. Kojima Fuhito, Manea Mihai Strategy-proofness of the probabilistic serial mechanism in large random assignment problems http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~kojima/papers.html.
13. Ma Jingpeng Strategy-proofness and strict core in a market with indivisibilities. Int. J. Game Theory 1994, 23:75-83.
14. McLennan Andrew Ordinal efficiency and the polyhedral separating hyperplane theorem. J. Econ. Theory 2002, 105:435-449.
15. Pápai Szilvia Strategyproof assignment by hierarchical exchange. Econometrica 2000, 68:1403-1434.
16. Pathak Parag A. Lotteries in student assignments http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~ppathak.
17. Roth Alvin E. Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods. Econ. Letters 1982, 9:127-132.
18. Roth Alvin E., Postlewaite Andrew Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods. J. Math. Econ. 1977, 4:131-137.
19. Roth Alvin E., Rothblum Uriel G. Truncation strategies in matching markets: In search of advice for participants. Econometrica 1999, 67:21-44.
20. Roth Alvin E., Sönmez Tayfun, Utku Ünver M. Kidney exchange. Quart. J. Econ. 2004, 119:457-488.
21. Sethuraman, Jay, 2001. A New Solution to the House Allocation Problem with Existing Tenants. Unpublished mimeo. University of Columbia.
22. Shapley Lloyd S., Scarf Herbert On cores and indivisibility. J. Math. Econ. 1974, 1:23-27.
23. Sönmez Tayfun, Ünver M.Utku House allocation with existing tenants: An equivalence. Games Econ. Behav. 2005, 52:153-185.
24. Svensson Lars-Gunnar Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods. Soc. Choice Welfare 1999, 16:557-567.
25. Von Neumann John A certain zero-sum two-person game equivalent to the optimal assignment problem. Contribution to the Theory of Games 1953, 5-12. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. H.W. Kuhn, A.W. Tucker (Eds.).
26. Yi{dotless}lmaz Özgür Random assignment under weak preferences. Games Econ. Behav. 2009, 66:546-558.
27. Zhou Lin On a conjecture by gale about one-sided matching problems. J. Econ. Theory 1990, 52:123-135.