Clearing algorithms for barter exchange markets: Enabling nationwide kidney exchanges

EC'07 - Proceedings of the Eighth Annual Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 295-304

  Abraham, David J ^a   Blum, Avrim ^a   Sandholm, Tuomas ^a  

^a Carnegie Mellon University ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

Barter; Branch and price; Column generation; Exchange; Kidney; Matching; Transplant

Indexed keywords

BRANCH-AND-PRICE; CADAVER KIDNEY; COLUMN GENERATION;

ALGORITHMS; BRANCH AND BOUND METHOD; MARKETING; MEDICAL APPLICATIONS; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

EID: 36448954266     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1250910.1250954     Document Type: Conference Paper

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