A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 131, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 231-250

  Katta, Akshay Kumar ^a   Sethuraman, Jay ^a  

^a Columbia University ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

Assignment; Envy freeness; Fairness; Indifferences; Maximum flows; Ordinal efficiency; Randomization; Strategy proofness

Indexed keywords

EID: 33749993483     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.05.001     Document Type: Article

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