Random assignment under weak preferences

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 66, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 546-558

  Yilmaz, Özgür ^a  

^a KOÇ UNIVERSITY   (Turkey)

Author keywords

No justified envy; Ordinal efficiency; Parametric maximum flow algorithm; Random assignment

Indexed keywords

EID: 67349162073     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.04.017     Document Type: Article

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