Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 90, Issue 1-2, 2006, Pages 215-237

  Ergin, Haluk ^a   Sönmez, Tayfun ^b  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b BOSTON COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

Boston mechanism; Priority matching mechanisms; School choice; Student optimal stable mechanism; Two sided matching

Indexed keywords

EID: 30544436021     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.02.002     Document Type: Article

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