The economist as engineer: Game theory, experimentation, and computation as tools for design economics

Econometrica

Volumn 70, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 1341-1378

  Roth, Alvin E ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Computational economics; Experimental economics; Game theory; Market design

Indexed keywords

COMPUTATION THEORY; GAME THEORY; LAWS AND LEGISLATION; TELECONFERENCING;

COMPUTATIONAL ECONOMICS; MARKET DESIGN;

ECONOMICS;

EID: 0036074727     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0262.00335     Document Type: Article

References (102)

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3. The market for federal judicial law clerks
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6. A tale of two mechanisms: Stubent placement
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8. The biggest auction ever: The sale of the British 3G telecom licenses
9. Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
10. The simple economics of optimal auctions
11. Competitive bidding in high-risk situations
12. Improving efficiency of on-campus housing: An experimental study
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16. College admissions and the stability of marriage
17. The allocation of landing rights by unanimity among competitors
18. Optimal allocation of public goods: A solution to the free rider problem
19. How Philadelphia hospitals appoint interns
20. The design of mechanisms for resource allocation
21. Auctions: A survey of experimental research
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23. Common value auctions with insider information
24. The dynamics of reorganization in matching markets: A laboratory experiment motivated by a natural experiment
25. A combinatorial auction with multiple winners for universal service
26. Job matching, coalition formation, and gross substitutes
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28. Why every economist should learn some auction theory
29. What really matters in auction design
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32. Experiments testing multi object allocation mechanisms
33. A market based mechanism for allocating space shuttle secondary payload priority
34. Using field experiments to test equivalence between auction formats: Magic on the Internet
35. Optimal auctions with risk averse buyers
36. Analyzing the airwaves auction
37. Selling spectrum rights
38. Stable marriage assignments for unequal sets
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45. Optimal auction design
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47. A combinatorial auction mechanism for airport time slot allocation
48. The economics of matching: Stability and incentives
49. Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
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51. The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
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54. A natural experiment in the organization of entry level labor markets: Regional markets for new physicians and surgeons in the U.K.
55. The NRMP as a labor market
56. Game theory as a tool for market design
57. Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
58. Last-minute bidding and the rules for ending second-price auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon auctions on the Internet
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60. The redesign of the matching market for American physicians: Some engineering aspects of economic design
61. Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
62. The college admissions problem revisited
63. Random paths to stability in two-sided matching
64. Jumping the gun: Imperfections and institutions related to the timing of market transactions
65. Turnaround time bottlenecks in market clearing: Decentralized matching in the market for clinical psychologists
66. Computationally manageable combinatorial auctions
67. Why are vickrey auctions rare?
68. On cores and indivisibility
69. Macro markets: Creating institutions for managing society's largest economic risks
70. Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
71. Using vouchers to privatize an economy: The Czech and Slovak case
72. Backward unraveling over time: The evolution of strategic behavior in the entry-level British medical labor markets
73. Counterspeculation, auctions and competitive sealed tenders
74. Competitive bidding with disparate information
75. Strategic analysis of auctions
76. Architecture of power markets