Timeshare exchange mechanisms

Management Science

Volumn 52, Issue 8, 2006, Pages 1223-1237

  Wang, Yu ^a   Krishna, Aradhna ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

Efficiency; Experimental economics; Mechanism design; Simulated market; Timeshare

Indexed keywords

EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS; MECHANISM DESIGN; SIMULATED MARKET; TIMESHARE;

COMPUTER SIMULATION; EFFICIENCY; MARKETING; RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT; RESOURCE ALLOCATION; ROBUSTNESS (CONTROL SYSTEMS);

INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT;

EID: 33748309116     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: 15265501     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1060.0513     Document Type: Review

References (21)

1. Abdulkadiroglu, A., T. Sonmez. 1999. House allocation with existing tenants. J. Econom. Theory 88(2) 233-260.
2. Amaldoss, W., S. Jain. 2002. David vs. Goliath: An analysis of asymmetric mixed-strategy games and experimental evidence. Management Sci. 48(8) 972-991.
3. Amaldoss, W., R. J. Meyer, J. S. Raju, A. Rapoport. 2000. Collaborating to compete. Marketing Sci. 19(2) 105-126.
4. Chen, Y., T. Sonmez. 2002. Improving efficiency of on-campus housing: An experimental study. Amer. Econom. Rev. 92(5) 1669-1689.
5. Gibbons, J. D. 1993. Nonparametric Statistics: An Introduction. Sage Publications, Inc., Newbury Park, CA.
6. Haruvy, E., I. Erev, D. Sonsino. 2001. The medium prizes paradox: Evidence from a simulated casino. J. Risk Uncertainty 22(3) 251-261.
7. Ho, T., K. Weigelt. 1996. Task complexity, equilibrium selection, and learning: An experimental study. Management Sci. 42(5) 659-679.
8. Kagel, J. H., D. Levin. 1993. Independent private value auctions: Bidder behavior in first-, second- and third-price auctions with varying numbers of bidders. Econom. J. 103(419) 868-879.
9. Kagel, J. H., A. E. Roth. 2000. The dynamics of reorganization in matching markets: A laboratory experiment motivated by a natural experiment. Quart. J. Econom. 115(1) 201-235.
10. Krishna, A., M. U. Unver. 2004. Efficiency enhanced course bidding: Evidence from a field experiment at the University of Michigan Business School. Working paper, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI.
11. Krishna, A., Y. Wang. The relationship between top trading cycles mechanism and top trading cycles and chains mechanism. J. Econom. Theory. Forthcoming.
12. Ragatz Associates, Inc. 1999. The economic benefits of RCI exchange affiliation: 1999 executive edition. Report, Ragatz Associates, Inc., Eugene, OR. http://www.rciaffiliates.com/industryoverview/industrystudies.asp.
13. Resort Condominiums International. 2003. Resort timesharing worldwide: 2003 edition. Summary report, RCI, Parsippany, NJ. http //www.rciaffiliates.com/industryoverview/industrystudies.asp.
14. Ross, L. F., E. S. Woodle. 2000. Ethical issues in increasing living kidney donations by expanding kidney paired exchange programs. Transplantation 69 1539-1543.
15. Roth, A. E., E. Peranson. 1997. The effects of the change in the NRMP matching algorithm. J. Amer. Medical Assoc. 278(9) 729-732.
16. Roth, A. E., T. Sonmez, M. U. Unver. 2004. Kidney exchange. Quart. J. Econom. 119(2) 457-188.
17. Shapley, L. S., H. E. Scarf. 1974. On cores and indivisibility. J. Math. Econom. 1(1) 23-37.
18. Sonmez, T., M. U. Unver. 2005. House allocation with existing tenants: An equivalence. Games Econom. Behavior 52 153-185.
19. Srivastava, J., D. Chakravarti, A. Rapoport. 2000. Price and margin negotiations in marketing channels: An experimental study of sequential bargaining under one-sided uncertainty and opportunity cost of delay. Marketing Sci. 19(2) 163-184.
20. Zenios, S., E. S. Woodle, L. F. Ross. 2001. Primum non nocere: Avoiding increased waiting times for individual racial and blood-type subsets of kidney wait list candidates in a living donor/cadaveric donor exchange program. Transplantation 66 406-107.
21. Zwick, R., A. Rapoport, A. K. C. Lo, A. V. Muthukrishnan. 2003. Consumer sequential search: Not enough or too much? Marketing Sci. 22(4) 503-519.