House Allocation with Existing Tenants

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 88, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 233-260

  Abdulkadiroglu, Atila ^a   Sönmez, Tayfun ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

^c KOÇ UNIVERSITY   (Turkey)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000819562     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1999.2553     Document Type: Article

References (23)

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