Deferred acceptance algorithms: History, theory, practice, and open questions

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 36, Issue 3-4, 2008, Pages 537-569

  Roth, Alvin E ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Deferred acceptance; Gale shapley; Market design; Matching

Indexed keywords

EID: 40149090944     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-008-0117-6     Document Type: Article

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