The relationship between top trading cycles mechanism and top trading cycles and chains mechanism

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 132, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 539-547

  Krishna, Aradhna ^a   Wang, Yu ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

Core; Indivisible goods; Matching; Mechanism design

Indexed keywords

EID: 33845675012     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.07.002     Document Type: Article

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