Efficient resource allocation on the basis of priorities

Econometrica

Volumn 70, Issue 6, 2002, Pages 2489-2497

  Ergin, Haluk I ^a  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; EDUCATION; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; PARETO PRINCIPLE; PROBLEM SOLVING; THEOREM PROVING;

NONMARKET MECHANISMS;

RESOURCE ALLOCATION;

EID: 0036434103     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0262.00383     Document Type: Article

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