A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 84, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 73-94

  Balinski, Michel ^a   Sönmez, Tayfun ^b  

^a ECOLE POLYTECHNIQUE   (France)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001776330     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1998.2469     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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