Coalitional strategy-proof house allocation

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 105, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 298-317

  Ehlers, Lars ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE MONTRÉAL   (Canada)

Author keywords

Coalitional strategy proofness; House allocation; Maximal domain

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036687008     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2813     Document Type: Article

References (17)

1. Random serial dictatorship and the core from random endowments in house allocation problems
2. House allocation with existing tenants
3. Voting by committees
4. Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules with one public good
5. A maximal domain for the existence of strategy-proof rules
6. Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems
7. Consistency in house allocation problems
8. Strategy-proofness and the Strict Core in a market with indivisibilities
9. Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems
10. Strategy-proof assignment by hierarchical exchange
11. Strategy-proof and nonbossy multiple assignment
12. Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
13. Power of voters and domain of preferences where voting by committees is strategy-proof
14. On cores and indivisibility
15. Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores
16. Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
17. Some properties of weak domination in an exchange market with indivisible goods