A new solution to the random assignment problem

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 100, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 295-328

  Bogomolnaia, Anna ^a   Moulin, Hervé ^b  

^a SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b RICE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Envy free; Ex post or ex ante efficiency; Ordinal; Random assignment; Strategyproofness

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035180456     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2000.2710     Document Type: Article

References (19)

1. Random serial dictatorship and the core from random endowments in house allocation problems
2. "Ordinal Efficiency and Dominated Sets of Assignments"
3. "A Simple Random Assignment Problem with a Unique Solution" forthcoming
4. Scheduling with opting out: Improving upon random priority
5. "Strategyproofness in the Assignment Market Game"
6. "Probabilistic Collective Decision Schemes"
7. "College Course Assignments and Optimal Lotteries"
8. Straightforwardness of game forms with lotteries as outcomes
9. Allocation by lot: A conceptual and empirical analysis
10. The efficient allocation of individuals to positions
11. Elicitation of honest preferences for the assignments of individuals to positions
12. "Ordinal Efficiency and the Polyhedral Separating Hyperplane Theorem"
13. "Two Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis" Econometric Society Monographs
14. Truncation strategies in matching markets: In search of advice for participants
15. On cores and indivisibility
16. Theories of justice based on symmetry
17. Equity, envy and efficiency
18. On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems