Constrained school choice

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 144, Issue 5, 2009, Pages 1921-1947

  Haeringer, Guillaume ^a   Klijn, Flip ^b  

^a UNIVERSITAT AUTÒNOMA DE BARCELONA   (Spain)

^b Barcelona)   (Spain)

Author keywords

Acyclic priority structure; Boston mechanism; Efficiency; Gale Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm; Matching; Nash equilibrium; School choice; Stability; Top Trading Cycles

Indexed keywords

EID: 68249122397     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2009.05.002     Document Type: Article

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