School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 64, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 303-328

  Pais, Joana ^a   Pintér, Ágnes ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LISBON   (Portugal)

^b UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID   (Spain)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 48649088830     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.01.008     Document Type: Article

References (26)

1. Abdulkadiroglu A., and Sönmez T. House allocation with existing tenants. J. Econ. Theory 88 2 (1999) 233-260
2. Abdulkadiroglu A., and Sönmez T. School choice: A mechanism design approach. Amer. Econ. Rev. 93 3 (2003) 729-747
3. Abdulkadiroglu A., Pathak P., Roth A., and Sönmez T. The Boston public school match. Amer. Econ. Rev. Pap. Proc. 95 2 (2005) 368-371
4. Barberà S., and Dutta B. Protective behavior in matching models. Games Econ. Behav. 8 (1995) 281-296
5. Chen Y., and Sönmez T. Improving efficiency of on-campus housing: An experimental study. Amer. Econ. Rev. 92 5 (2002) 1669-1686
6. Chen Y., and Sönmez T. An experimental study of house allocation mechanisms. Econ. Letters 83 1 (2002) 137-140
7. Chen Y., and Sönmez T. School choice: An experimental study. J. Econ. Theory 127 (2006) 202-231
8. Dubins L., and Freedman D. Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley algorithm. Amer. Math. Mon. 88 (1981) 485-494
9. Ehlers, L., 2003. In search of advice for physicians in entry-level medical markets. Cahiers recherche 13-2003. Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie Quantitative, CIREQ
10. Ehlers L. In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm. Games Econ. Behav. 48 (2004) 249-270
11. Ehlers L., and Massó J. Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets. J. Econ. Theory 136 1 (2007) 587-600
12. Ergin H., and Sönmez T. Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism. J. Public Econ. 90 (2006) 215-237
13. Gale D., and Shapley L. College admissions and the stability of marriage. Amer. Math. Mon. 69 (1962) 9-15
14. Greiner B. An online recruitment system for economic experiments. In: Kremer K., and Macho V. (Eds). Forschung und wissenschaftliches Rechnen 2003. GWDG Bericht vol. 63 (2004), Ges. für Wiss. Datenverarbeitung, Göttingen 79-93
15. Harrison G., and McCabe K. Stability and preference distortion in resource matching: An experimental study of the marriage problem. In: Smith V. (Ed). Research in Experimental Economics vol. 6 (1996), JAI Press 53-129
16. Haruvy E., Roth A., and Ünver U. The dynamics of law clerk matching: An experimental and computational investigation of proposals for reform of the market. J. Econ. Dynam. Control 30 (2006) 457-486
17. Kagel J., and Roth A. The dynamics of reorganization in matching markets: A laboratory experiment motivated by a natural experiment. Quart. J. Econ. 115 1 (2000) 201-235
18. McKinney C., Niederle M., and Roth A. The collapse of a medical labour clearinghouse (and Why such failures are rare). Amer. Econ. Rev. 95 (2005) 878-889
19. Nalbantian H., and Schotter A. Matching and efficiency in the baseball free-agent system: An experimental examination. J. Lab. Econ. 13 (1995) 1-31
20. Olson M., and Porter D. An experimental examination into design of decentralized methods to solve the assignment problem with and without money. Econ. Theory 4 (1994) 11-40
21. Roth A. The economics of matching: Stability and incentives. Math. Operations Res. 7 (1982) 617-628
22. Roth A. Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisibilities. Econ. Letters 9 (1982) 127-132
23. Roth A. Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences. Games Econ. Behav. 1 (1989) 191-209
24. Roth A., and Rothblum U. Truncation strategies in matching markets-In search of advice for participants. Econometrica 67 (1999) 21-43
25. Shapley L., and Scarf H. On cores and indivisibility. J. Math. Econ. 1 (1974) 23-28
26. Ünver, U., 2001. On the survival of some two-sided matching mechanisms: An experimental and computational investigation of the stability hypothesis. Mimeo, Koç University