Pairwise kidney exchange

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 125, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 151-188

  Roth, Alvin E ^a,b   Sönmez, Tayfun ^c   Utku Unver M ^d  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United States)

^c BOSTON COLLEGE   (United States)

^d UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

Author keywords

Egalitarian mechanism; Kidney exchange; Lorenz dominance; Market design; Matching; Priority mechanism

Indexed keywords

EID: 29544448916     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.04.004     Document Type: Article

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