Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 38, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 347-361

  Miyagawa, Eiichi ^a  

^a Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

Author keywords

Housing market; Indivisible goods; Mechanism design; Nonbossiness; Strategy proofness

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036167358     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.2001.0858     Document Type: Article

References (20)

1. "Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems"
2. "Top Dominance and the Possibility of Strategy-Proof Stable Solutions to Matching Problems"
3. "Coalitional Strategy-Proofness, Resource-Monotonicity, and Separability for Multiple Assignment Problems"
4. "College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage"
5. "The Efficient Allocation of Individuals to Positions"
6. "Strategy-Proofness, Solidarity, and Consistency for Multiple Assignment Problems"
7. "Strategy-Proofness and the Strict Core in a Market with Indivisibilities"
8. "House Allocation with Transfers"
9. "Strategy-Proof and Nonbossy Multiple Assignments"
10. "Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange"
11. "Individual Rationality and Nash's Solution to the Bargaining Problem"
12. "Incentive Compatibility in a Market with Indivisible Goods"
13. "Weak Versus Strong Domination in a Market with Indivisible Goods"
14. "Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points"
15. "On Cores and Indivisibility"
16. "Strategy-Proofness and Essentially Single-Valued Cores"
17. "Some Properties of Weak Domination in an Exchange Market with Indivisible Goods"
18. "On a Conjecture by Gale About One-Sided Matching Problems"