On the Shapley-Scarf economy: The case of multiple types of indivisible goods

Journal of Mathematical Economics

Volumn 35, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 1-15

  Konishi, Hideo ^a   Quint, Thomas ^b   Wako, Jun ^c  

^a BOSTON COLLEGE   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA   (United States)

^c GAKUSHUIN UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

Competative equilibrium; Core; Separable preferences; Shapley Scarf economy; Strategy proofness

Indexed keywords

EID: 0011337651     PISSN: 03044068     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-4068(00)00061-6     Document Type: Article

References (14)

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